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INTRODUCTION

On October 10, 1985, four United States fighter planes were
dispatched from an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean Sea
under orders to intercept an Egyptian jetliner carrying the alleged
terrorist hijackers of the Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro.1
1. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 6. A White House spokesman said
President Reagan ordered the military action after Egypt repeatedly refused to

prosecute the hijackers. Id. The Achille Lauro was carrying more than 400 passengers, including about a dozen United States citizens on a Mediterranean
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The United States fighter planes forced the Egyptian aircraft to
land in Italy, where the hijackers were taken immediately into
custody by Italian authorities and charged with crimes that included kidnapping, ship hijacking and murder 2 for the death of

cruise when it was hijacked Oct. 7, 1985, by four Palestinian gunmen believed to
be associated with a Tunis-based faction of the Palestinian Liberation Front.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 6. The gunmen demanded the release of 50
Palestinian prisoners in Israel and asylum in Syria. NEwswEEK, Oct. 21, 1985, at
35. Egypt agreed to provide the gunmen with safe exit from Egypt upon release
of the hostages. As the hijackers were being exported from Egypt, United States
warplanes intercepted the Egyptian plane.
2. N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at Al, col. 6. If convicted in Italy, the hijackers
could face life imprisonment. Id. The United States government urged Italy to
turn the alleged hijackers over to the custody of the United States to face prosecution in a United States courtroom. Italy, however, insisted upon dealing with
the terrorists first, claiming that the Italian legal system was the proper jurisdiction to try the terrorists since the crime was committed on an Italian ship in
international waters. TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 29. United States officials nonetheless prepared extradition charges against the hijackers. The charges included
hostage taking, piracy and conspiracy. Washington Post, Oct. 15, 1985, at Al,
col. 6. While extradition of the hijackers to the United States received widespread attention immediately after the hijacking, aspects of extradition in connection with the Achille Lauro incident are beyond the scope of this
RecentDevelopment.
The United States charges apparently are based partly on a 1984 act entitled
The Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage Taking
(Hostage Act), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1203 (West Supp. 1985). See N.Y. Times, Oct. 11,
1985, at All, col. 4. The Hostage Act states in part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, whoever,
whether inside or outside the United States, seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to
compel a third person or a governmental organization to do or abstain
from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of
the person detained, or attempts to do so, shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1203 (West Supp. 1985). On July 26, 1985, Sen. Arlen Specter of
Pennsylvania proposed the Terrorist Death Penalty Act, S. 1508, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S10,180 (1985) which would amend Title 18 of the United
States Code to authorize application of the death penalty upon conviction of
first degree murder under the Hostage Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1203 (West Supp.

1985).
Other United States charges against the hijackers included piracy, which is a
federal crime in the United States under 18 U.S.C. § .1651 (1982). Section 1651
states:
Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the
law of nations, or is afterwards brought into or found in the United States,
shall be imprisoned for life.
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Leon Klinghoffer,5 a United States citizen and passenger aboard
the commandeered Italian ship. This single show of force sparked
international turmoil, leaving in its wake injured relations between otherwise friendly nations. In the aftermath of the Achille

Lauro incident, tensions flared between the United States and
two of its allies, Egypt and Italy.4 Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak called the United States' interception of its airliner a
separate "act of piracy" that had caused a "coolness and strain"
in United States-Egyptian relations. The Achille Lauro incident
was also blamed for the subsequent collapse of the Italian proUnited States government,6 which crumbled under public outcry
a Palestinian leader who allegedly orchesover Italy's release of
7
hijacking.
the
trated

Id.

The high seas is included in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States under 18 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West Supp. 1985) which states that
"special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" includes:
(7) Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an
offense by or against a national of the United States.
18 U.S.C.A. § 7(7) (West Supp. 1985). International law also recognizes piracy as
a universal crime, which means that any state can prosecute and punish persons
accused of piracy whenever custody over that person is obtained. Terrorism per
se is not yet considered a universal offense. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. For a more detailed discussion of universal offenses, see infra notes
68-74 and accompanying text.
3. Klinghoffer, 69, a Jewish American confined to a wheelchair, was believed
to have been shot in the head. His body, along with his wheelchair, was tossed
into the Mediterranean Sea. His body later was recovered. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10,
1985, at Al, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at Al, col. 4.
4. TIME, Oct, 21, 1985, at 24. See also Washington Post, Oct. 18, 1985, at Al,
col. 6.
5. TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 24.
6. Washington Post, Oct. 17, 1985, at Al, col. 5. Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi resigned after criticism by the United States and a segment of the
Italian government of his decision to allow a Palestinian leader who allegedly
participated in the hijacking plot to go free. Id. at Al, col. 6. Craxi was later
reinstated. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1985, at Al, col. 4. Upon resigning, Craxi criticized the United States use of force to intercept the Egyptian airliner. He
claimed that the United States had landed military transport planes and personnel at an Italian-American airforce base with orders to return the hijackers to
the United States. Id.
7. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 21, 1985, at 32. The head of the Palestinian Liberation
Front, Muhammad Abbas, who participated in negotiations to free the hostages,
accompanied the four hijackers on the intercepted flight from Egypt. Italian authorities detained the four hijackers after the plane landed in Italy. Abbas, how-
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Less than three months after the Achille Lauro incident and
only days before the close of 1985, terrorists struck again by unleashing hand granades and spraying gunfire at the check-in
counters of airport terminals in Rome and Vienna." Five United
States citizens were killed in the Rome airport raid.9 The attacks
spurred cries of military retaliation by Israel 0 and the imposition
of economic and political sanctions by the United States against
Libya.1
The United States' aggressive and bold reaction to the Achille
Lauro hijacking and its threat of sanctions following the airport
raids illustrate the executive branch's frustration with its impotence in stemming the rise in terrorist attacks against United
States personnel and citizens abroad.' 2 Because of these attacks,
ever, was allowed to flee to Yugoslavia despite pleas by the United States to
either prosecute or extradite him. The United States also issued warrants for
Abbas' arrest. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
8. Washington Post, Dec. 28, 1985, at Al, cols. 1, 3 and 5.
9. Id.; N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
10. Washington Post, Dec. 28, 1985, at Al, cols. 1, 3 and 5.
11. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1986, at Al, col. 6. The United States directed sanctions against Libya because of its support for terrorist groups and its alleged role
in the attacks in Rome and Vienna. Id. at A6, col. 1. Libyan leader Muammar
Qaddafi threatened the United States with increased terrorism at United States
targets should the United States retaliate militarily against Libya. Id.
12. Reports indicate that in 1983, 2,574 domestic and international incidents
of state-sponsored terrorism were committed against foreign nationals, institutions or governments. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM, STATESPONSORED TERRORISM, S. Doc. No. 56, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1985) [hereinaf-

ter cited as

STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM.]

More

than 10,000 persons were killed

in 1983 as a result of these incidents, including 301 United States citizens. In
1984, the total incidents rose to 3,282. Assassinations numbered 362 in 1983 and
414 in 1984. Id. Four hundred international terrorist attacks were reported between 1973-1983 against United States diplomatic and military facilities and
United States personnel. Id. These casualties resulted from bombings, murders,
kidnappings and malicious vandalism. Id. The Subcommittee report describes
the threat of state-sponsored terrorism:
At present, communist states, especially the Soviet Union, and a number
of other militant totalitarian regimes like Iran, Libya, and Syria, are actively exporting terrorist and terror techniques into other countries whose
governments they wish to injure or overthrow. Thus, their activity is a
manifestation of transnational state-sponsored terrorism.
Id. at xi. The report predicts that state-sponsored terrorism will increase in the
future. "Operations have become more effective, wider in scope, more sophisticated, and with a higher destructive potential. It can be assumed that U.S. adversaries will continue to utilize terrorism - 'warfare on the cheap' -- as a
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President Reagan and other public officials have advocated a
tougher stance toward the apprehension and prosecution of terrorists, including support for aggressive preemptive strikes upon
known terrorists. 13 However, the Achille Lauro incident and the
airport attacks clearly illustrate the international repercussions
that arise when one nation either acts unilaterally or threatens to
act in concert with other nations to combat an international prob14
lem such as terrorism.

significant strategic tool of their foreign policy." Id. at xv.
13. United States Secretary of State George Shultz has publicly stated that
traditional methods of enhanced security and better intelligence are no longer
adequate to combat terrorism and more aggressive tactics are necessary. See
N.Y. Times, April 4, 1984, at A13,col. 1. At other times, Shultz has asserted that
governments must improve their methods of infiltrating terrorist groups and be
willing to take appropriate preventive or preemptive action to strike terrorists
before they strike. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 25, 1984, at A3, col. 4. Following a
1985 terrorist attack upon United States Marines and civilians in San Salvador,
infra note 138, an outraged President Reagan said, "The war which terrorists
are waging is not only directed against the United States, it is a war against all
civilized society. This is a war in which innocent civilians are targets. This is a
war in which innocent civilians are intentional victims and our servicemen have
become specific targets. This cannot continue." N.Y. Times, June 21, 1985, at
Al, col. 3. Reagan further warned that the United States was ready to take
forceful action stating:
I believe that our actions must be appropriate and proportionate to the
criminal acts which have been taken against our citizens. Those who are
responsible for such lawlessness and those who support it must know that
the consequences of their actions will never be capitulation to terrorist
demands. We are both a nation of peace and a people of justice. By our
very nature, we are slow to anger and magnanimous in helping those in
less fortunate circumstances. No nation has been more generous to others
in need. But we also have our limits-and our limits have been reached.
Id. at A9, col. 1.
14. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1985, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 1, col. 1.
The newspaper states that the United States paid a high price for its triumph in
the Achille Lauro incident. The author suggests that Washington was so preoccupied with the search for and seizure of the hijackers of the Achille Lauro that
little attention or concern was paid to reactions of Egypt and Italy and that
Egypt viewed the interception of its airline as an attack by the United States on
its national dignity. Id. See generally Evans, Perspectives on InternationalTerrorism, 17 W.LAmETTE L. REV. 151, 151-55 (1980). Evans states that
[There] is a growing disposition on the part of a wide variety of states to
recognize that international terrorists are no respecters of persons, places,
governments, international organizations, or international communications
systems. In the long run, each state has a stake in the control of international terrorism, lest it find itself controlled by terrorists or, at least, en-
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Within the shadow of these recent acts of terrorism and amid
United States' protestations to "get tough" with terrorism, the
United States Senate passed on February 19, 1986, the Terrorist
Prosecution Act of 198515 (Terrorist Prosecution Act or the
Act).1" The bill follows a flurry of recent terrorist legislation
aimed at both the prevention of terrorism and the punishment of
terrorist offenders. The Act would amend Title 18 of the United
States Code to give United States courts jurisdiction to prosecute
terrorists who commit murder and other violent acts against
United States nationals abroad or terrorists who conspire outside
the United States to commit murder against United States citizens within the United States. The proposed legislation would apply when these terrorists are apprehended and brought to the
United States to stand trial. The legislation bases jurisdiction on
Congress' authority to apply its statutes extraterritorially when
the proscribed conduct threatens the United States' security or
government functions.18 Enforcement of the Act contemplates the
thralled in an unending struggle to contain them.
Id. at 151.
Evans concludes that treaties, laws, security measures and prosections, while
not eliminating international terrorism, have proven effective in controlling terrorism. Id. at 159. The author states, however, that measures to control terrorism are only effective "if they are founded on law and carried out through cooperative state action." Id. at 164. (emphasis supplied).
15. S. 1429, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 132 CONG. REc. S1382-88 (1986). The Terrorist Prosecution Act was sponsored by Sen. Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, a
Republican, who was elected to the Senate in 1980 and is a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The Senate bill was cosponsored by Senators Andrews,
Boren, Cohen, D'Amato, Denton, Dusenburger, Grassley, Hecht, Leahy, McConnell, Murkowski, Roth, Levin, and Hawkins. The bill passed the Senate by a 92-

0 vote.
16. The Terrorist Prosecution Act which passed the Senate was substantially
the same as an amended version of S. 1429 which passed the Senate Judiciary
Committee on Dec. 12, 1985. The amended S. 1429, however, was substantially
different from prior versions of the bill and was the result of a compromise
worked out between the Judiciary Committee, the Justice Department and the
State Department.
17. In 1984, three major pieces of anti-terrorism legislation were enacted: (1)
The Act for the Prevention and Punishment of Hostage Taking, supra note 2,
(2) The Aircraft Sabotage Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 31-32 (West Supp. 1985), which
addresses terrorist acts of aircraft piracy and aircraft sabotage, and (3) The 1984
Act to Combat International Terrorism, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3071 (1985), which provides rewards for information leading to the arrest and conviction of terrorists.
18. See infra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
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use of force, if necessary, to apprehend known terrorists and return them to the United States for prosecution and punishment. 19
This Recent Development examines the jurisdictional bases for
the proposed extraterritorial extension of The Terrorist Prosecution Act to crimes that do not occur within the territory of the
United States and to persons who are not United States citizens.
The historical basis for allowing the prosecution of persons who
have been forcibly brought into the court's jurisdiction and constitutional due process concerns that accompany such enforcement means are also detailed. Also discussed is the potential conflict between the Act and United States foreign relations law,
particularly with respect to the possible forceful intrusion by the
United States upon another state's territorial sovereignty to apprehend terrorists and bring them to justice. Finally, this article
examines the potential consequences of using such forceful measures to international relations, particularly when United States'
allies with sophisticated legal systems and proper jurisdictional
claims are equally willing to prosecute terrorists themselves.
II.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Jurisdictional Limitations: Laws Having Extraterritorial
Effect

International law recognizes limitations on a state's authority
to legislate and apply its domestic laws extraterritorially when
such laws conflict with the interests of other states.20 The RESTATEMENT (REvISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES expresses this limitation in terms of a state's jurisdiction

to prescribe, to adjudicate and to enforce. 2 ' Jurisdiction to pre19. See infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
20. See RESTATEMENT (REvISED) OF FOREIGN RmATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES Part IV, Introductory Note, at 179 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (REvISED)]
21. Id. at § 401. Section 401 of the RESTATEMENT (REVISED) states:
Under international law, a state is subject to limitations on its authority to
exercise
(1) "jurisdiction to prescribe," i.e., to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things,
whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or
regulation, or by determination of a court;
(2) "jurisdiction to adjudicate," i.e., to subject persons or things to the
process of its courts or administrative tribunals, whether in civil or in
criminal proceedings, and whether or not the state is a party to the pro-
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scribe, the authority of a state to legislate and to apply its substantive laws in a transnational context to particular persons and
circumstances,2 2 is a precondition to a state's ability to enforce its
laws.23 International law recognizes certain bases of jurisdiction to
prescribe.2 4 Underlying these bases of jurisdiction are strong notions of territoriality and nationality.2 5 These notions also confer
jurisdiction to prescribe conduct that occurs outside a state's ter-

ceedings; and
(3) "jurisdiction to enforce," i.e., to induce or compel compliance or
punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations, whether through the
courts or by use of executive, administrative, police, or other non-judicial
action.
Id. For a discussion of the historical development of jurisdiction to adjudicate,
see RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 20, § 421, comment a, citing such cases
as International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977), World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980), and Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
22. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 20, Part IV, introductory note, at
185.
23. See Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Groleau v. United States, 389 U.S. 884 (1967). Rivard notes the general principle that "[u]nder international law a state does not have jurisdiction
to enforce a rule of law prescribed by it, unless it had jurisdiction to prescribe
the rule." 375 F.2d at 885. Comment a to § 421 of the RESTATEMENT (REviSED)
states:
Under international law a state may not exercise authority to enforce law
which it has no jurisdiction to prescribe. Such assertion of jurisdiction,
whether carried out through the courts or by non-judicial means, may be
objected to both by the affected person directly and by the state concerned at the international level.
RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 20, § 421, comment a.
24.

Id.

§ 402. Section 402 of the RESTATEMENT (REviSED) states the accepted

bases of jurisdiction to prescribe:
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1) (a) conduct a substantial part of which takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its
territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, status, interests or relations of its nationals outside as
well as within its territory; or
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals which
is directed against the security of the state or a limited class of other state
interests.

Id.
25. Id. § 402, comment a.
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ritory by nonnationals when such conduct has an effect within the
prescribing state.26
These international legal principles reflect limitations placed
upon the enactment of domestic legislation.17 Legislation prescribed by Congress generally applies only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States or to nationals of the United
States. 28 Congress does have authority, however, to extend its
laws extraterritorially, 29 especially if such intent is clearly ex26. See discussion of the protective principle of jurisdiction, infra notes 5261 and accompanying text.
27. See RESTATEMENT (REvISED), supra note 20, § 401, comment b, which
states:
International law deals with the propriety of the exercise of jurisdiction by
a state, and the resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction between states. The
domestic law of the United States considers the propriety of exercises of
jurisdiction by legislative, executive, administrative or judicial bodies, both
federal and State, under the U.S. Constitution, the State constitutions,
and State and federal law. In general, domestic law is construed, when
fairly possible, so as not to bring it into conflict with international law.
28. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932). In Blackmer, a
United States citizen residing in Paris, France, was found guilty of contempt of
court for refusing to respond to subpoenas served upon him in France which
ordered him to appear as a witness at a criminal trial in the United States. The
Court, holding that United States laws were applicable to the citizen abroad,
concluded that "[w]hile the legislation of the Congress, unless the contrary intent appears, is construed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, the question of its application, so far as citizens of the United
States in foreign countries are concerned, is one of construction, not of legislative power." Id. at 437. See also United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 750 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973) (absent evidence of contrary intent, presumption exists against extraterritorial application of a statute); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (reluctance by court to ascribe
extraterritorial effect to a statute). Accord RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 38 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)] (stating that United States law applies only to conduct occurring within or having
effect within the territory of the United States unless clearly indicated by
statute.)

29. The case most cited for this proposition is United States v. Bowman, 260
U.S. 94 (1922), in which the Court held that a United States law prohibiting
presentment of a false claim against the government or its officers could be applied extraterritorially. The Bowman court's discussion of the locus of a crime is
often cited:
The necessary locus, [for application of a statute] when not specially defined, depends upon the purpose of Congress as evinced by the description
and nature of the crime and upon the territorial limitations upon the
power and jurisdiction of a government to punish crime under the law of

924

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 18:915

pressed or if such intent can be inferred from the purpose and
nature of the statute.8 0 Nonetheless, these laws must be based
upon sound jurisdictional principles recognized by domestic
courts and international law. Thus, legislation proposed by Congress, such as the Terrorist Prosecution Act, must be based upon
one or a combination of the five"' traditional theories of jurisdiction: the nationality theory, the territorial theory, the protective
principle, the passive personality principle, or the universal theory. 2 The most common and widely-accepted independent bases

nations. Crimes against private individuals or their property, like assaults,
murder, burglary, larceny, robbery, arson, embezzlement, and frauds of all
kinds, which affect the peace and good order of the community, must of
course be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the government
where it may properly exercise it. If punishment of them is to be extended
to include those committed outside of the strict territorial jurisdiction, it
is natural for Congress to say so in the statute, and failure to do so will
negative the purpose of Congress in this regard.
Id. at 97-98. For decisions subsequent to Bowman, see United States v. Baker,
609 F.2d 134, 137 (5th Cir. 1980) (nature of drug control statute mandated extraterritorial application to obtain jurisdiction) ; United States v. King, 552 F.2d
833, 851 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977) (territorial jurisdiction
is not exclusive nor does it accurately characterize a state's power to exercise
jurisdiction beyond its geographical boundaries).
30. See United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal.), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 972 (1981). In Layton, the defendant was indicted on four criminal
counts in connection with the 1978 death of a United States Congressman in
Guyana. The court said the inference of extraterritorial jurisdiction was reasonable because Congress, by passing legislation to protect Congressmen from assault
and murder, was prohibiting conduct that could easily occur outside the territorial limits of the United States. 509 F. Supp. at 217-19. See also Skiriotes v.
Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73-74 (1941) (application of criminal statute dealing with
acts directly injurious to the government and capable of being committed without regard to location are construed as applicable to United States citizens upon
the high seas or in a foreign country); United States v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294
(5th Cir. 1974) (applications of statute prohibiting possessing, forging, and uttering of stolen checks to acts committed outside United States); United States v.
Cotten, 471 F.2d at 750 (extraterritorial application of theft statute to acts committed overseas); Stegeman v. United States, 425 F.2d 984, 986 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied 400 U.S. 837 (1970) (application of United States bankruptcy statute to
United States citizens outside territory of government).
31. The objective territorial principle, infra notes 48-51 and accompanying
text, is often referred to as a sixth theory of jurisdiction. This author prefers to
consider the objective territorial principle as a subdivision of the territorial theory rather than a distinct jurisdictional principle.
32. See United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 392
U.S. 936 (1968). See also HarvardResearch in InternationalLaw, Jurisdiction
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of jurisdiction are territoriality or nationality.33 All five jurisdictional bases, however, have been asserted to encompass crimes
committed by nonnationals outside the United States' territory,
either by expanding the theory of territoriality, by relying upon
the protective principle, passive personality or universality principles or by asserting a combination of these theorie. 34 Each of
these theories and examples of their uses are discussed below.
1. Nationality
Nationality jurisdiction allows a state to prescribe laws that extend to its nationals regardless of where the proscribed offense
occurs. 35 Therefore, under international law, a state has almost
unlimited legal control over its nationals and can prosecute either
while they are still abroad or after they return to the United
States for acts committed abroad. 3 The theory underlying nationality jurisdiction is that persons who commit crimes owe allegiance to the state of which they are considered nationals.37 Nationality jurisdiction, for example, has been used as a bases for
authority to order a United States national abroad to answer a
subpoena requiring his presence in the United States as a witness.38 Principles of nationality are also relied upon as a jurisdictional base to tax foreign nationals.3 9 Recently, the exercise by

With Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. SuPP 435, 445 (1935) [hereinafter
cited as Harvard Research]; Blakesley, United States JurisdictionOver ExtraterritorialCrime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1110-11 (1982) [hereinaf-

ter cited as ExtraterritorialCrime].
33. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 20, § 402, comment a.
34. See ExtraterritorialCrime, supra note 32, at 1113.
35. See Harvard Research, supra note 32, at 519. See also Extraterritorial
Crime, supra note 32, at 1110-11. This Recent Development assumes that the
Terrorist Prosecution Act is designed primarily to reach crimes committed by
nonnationals of the United States. It also assumes that if the offender were a
United States national, then United States jurisdiction over the offender would
be virtually assured. Therefore, the nationality principle will be only briefly
considered.
36. Harvard Research, supra note 32, at 519.
37. Id.
38. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). In Blackmer, the
court said that the "jurisdiction of the United States over its absent citizen, so
far as the binding effect of its legislation is concerned, is a jurisdiction in personam, as he is personally bound to take notice of the laws that are applicable to
him and to obey them." Id. at 438.
39.

See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 20,

§§ 411-13.
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the United States of nationality jurisdiction over foreign corporations owned and controlled by corporations that are40nationals of
the United States has been a source of controversy.
2.

TerritorialJurisdiction

A state's authority to exercise jurisdiction over all persons and
objects within its territory is well-established. 41 The territoriality
40. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 20, § 402, comment e. Section
414 of the RESTATEMENT (REVISED) deals with jurisdiction over activities of foreign branches and subsidiaries. The controversy over the definition of "national," e.g., inclusion of domicile or resident, further complicates use of the nationality principle. Id. § 402, comment e.
41. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116
(1812) in which the Court states:
The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation, not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source,
would imply a dimunition of its sovereignty, to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty, to the same extent, in that
power which could impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to
the full and complete power of a nation, within its own territories, must be
traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other
legitimate source.
Id. at 135. The territorial principle has also been used to explain a state's authority to apply its laws to ships and aircraft on the basis that a vessel or aircraft is a "floating" (or flying) "territory." RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note
20, § 402, reporter's note 3. In the seminal case of The S.S. "Lotus," (Turk. v.
France) 1927 P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 10 (Judgment of Sept. 7), the court was faced
with a sensitive jurisdictional issue following the collision of two Turkish and
French steamships. Eight Turkish sailors and passengers died in the collision. At
issue was whether Turkey had jurisdiction under international law to prosecute
a French lieutenant who had commanded the French vessel. Id. 1927 P.C.I.J.,
ser. A, No. 10, at 12. The French claimed that jurisdiction was held by the state
under whose flag the vessel sails. Id. at 13. The French also claimed that the
Turkish court needed some base of jurisdiction to try the French citizen. Id. at
18. The court said the primary restriction imposed by international law upon a
state is the prohibition against exercising its power in the territory of another
state. Id. The court noted, however, that international law does not generally
prohibit states from exercising jurisdiction with respect to acts abroad. Id. at 19.
The Lotus court ruled in favor of Turkey. The case is subsequently cited for its
discussion of the exercise of jurisdiction over offenses committed outside a
state's territory but having effects within the territory.
No argument has come to the knowledge of the Court from which it can be
deduced that States recognize themselves to be under an obligation towards each other only to have regard to the place where the author of the
offence happens to be at the time of the offence. On the contrary, it is
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theory determines jurisdiction according to the location of the
crime. 42 A state acquires sovereignty by asserting the right to prescribe and enforce its laws within its territory.43 The territorial
principle recognizes that the state where the crime is committed
usually has the strongest interest in and the greatest facilities for
prosecuting crimes committed either by its nationals or by
aliens."
The territorial principle has been subdivided into the subjective and objective territorial views.45 The subjective territorial
view allows extension of jurisdiction over offenses committed
outside United States' borders when an essential element of the
crime occurs within the United States. 46 As an illustration, the
subjective territorial principle was used to assert jurisdiction over
a homicide when the defendant mailed poisonous candy from California to an intended victim in Delaware. The Delaware recipient
died from eating the candy. 47 The objective territorial view expands territorial jurisdiction by allowing states to reach acts committed wholly outside a state's territory if such acts cause detrimental effects within the state.48 The RESTATEMENT (REVISED),
certain that the courts of many countries, even of countries which have
given their criminal legislation a strictly territorial character, interpret
criminal law in the sense that offences, the authors of which at the moment of commission are in the territory of another State, are nevertheless
to be regarded as having been committed in the national territory, if one
of the constituent elements of the offence, and more especially its effects,
have taken place there.
Id. at 23.
42. Id. at 48.
43. See ExtraterritorialCrime, supra note 32, at 1114.
44. See Note, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionand JurisdictionFollowing Forcible Abduction: A New Israeli Precedent in InternationalLaw, 72 MICH. L.
REv. 1087, 1089 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ExtraterritorialJurisdiction].
45. See Harvard Research, supra note 32, at 484-508; Rivard, 375 F.2d at
886.
46. ExtraterritorialCrime, supra note 32, at 1118-19.
47. People v. Botkin, 132 Cal. 231, 64 P. 286 (1901).
48. ExtraterritorialCrime, supra note 32, at 1123. Blakesley suggests that
the objective territorial view is properly applied only when the effects of the
extraterritorial crime were intended to occur within a state's territory and when
the effects actually did occur there. Id. at 1132. For cases basing jurisdiction on
the bbjective territorial principle, see Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285
(1911) (bribery of public officer produced detrimental effects in United States
although acts occurred elsewhere); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851-52
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977) (defendant's prosecution for
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which refers to the objective territorial view as the "effects principle," acknowledges that controversy has arisen in the international arena over the United States' use of the effects principle to
challenge activity abroad that has an economic effect within the
United States. 49 For example, United States' application of its antitrust and securities laws to acts performed outside the United
States has stirred criticism from foreign states.5 0 By combining
the subjective and objective territorial views, the territorial principle allows jurisdiction if a crime is committed either in whole or
in part within a state's territory.51
3.

Protective Jurisdiction

The protective principle provides a basis of jurisdiction to prescribe laws that attach legal consequences to conduct occurring
outside a state's territory if that conduct harms or could harm a
state's national interests. 52 One justification for this principle is

unlawful distribution in Japan of heroin intended for United States importation
justified under objective territorial principle); United States v. Fernandez, 496
F.2d 1294, 1296 (5th Cir. 1974) (forging and uttering of stolen United States
Treasury checks in Mexico produced detrimental effects in United States.); Layton, 509 F. Supp at 215-16 (murder of United States Congressman in Guyana
produced harmful effects in the United States); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 28, § 18, comment a; RESTATEMENT (REviSED), supra note 20 §
402(1)(c); cf. United States v. Columbia-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 360 (5th Cir.

1979) (effects within United States insufficient to support jurisdiction under objective territorial principle because not a conspiracy as in Fernandez and
Rivard).
49. RESTATEMENT (R vISED), supra note 20, § 402, reporter's note 2; see also
id., comment e, stating that "a state may exercise jurisdiction based on impact
in the state, but only when the effect or intended effect is substantial and the
exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable under § 403."
50. See id. § 403, comment a. See also id., introductory note to "Jurisdiction
to Prescribe," at 186, where drafters state that the:
[a]pplication of antitrust and securities laws, both on governmental and on
private initiative, has often reached beyond the territorial frontiers of the
United States, and has from time to time been perceived by other states to
be intruding into their rightful domain. In response to the reactions of
other states the United States has begun to modify its assertions of jurisdiction in some areas.
Id.
51. See ExtraterritorialCrime, supra note 32, at 1114; Harvard Research,
supra note 32, at 495.
52. See ExtraterritorialCrime, supra note 32, at 1134-35. The protective
principle is restated in the RESTATEMENT (REviSED), supra note 20, § 402(3),
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that domestic legislation of most states inadequately regulates or
punishes offenses committed within the state's territory which
53
threaten the security or sovereign interests of a foreign state.
Therefore, the state whose interests are threatened is justified in
legislating against such conduct. 4 United States courts have asserted jurisdiction under the protective principle to crimes
outside United States territory such as making false statements
on a VISA application,5" forging United States documents,56 inducing an alien to enter the United States illegally, 57 and making
false statements to secure necessary documents to enter the
United States.58
The protective principle is difficult to apply, however, because
the scope of conduct that potentially threatens a state's security
or the operation of its governmental functions is not well-de-

which states that under international law a state may exercise jurisdiction to
prescribe and apply its law with respect to "certain conduct outside its territory
by persons not its nationals which is directed against the security of the state or
a limited class of other state interests." See § 402, comment d, citing as examples of such conduct "crimes by developed legal systems, e.g., espionage, counterfeiting of the state's seal or currency, the falsification of official documents, as
well as perjury before consular officials or conspiracies to violate the immigration or customs laws, which are offenses likely to be committed outside the territory by aliens." See Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 10. The Pizzarusso court distinguished the protective and objective territorial principles, noting that the
objective territorial view requires an actual effect inside the state while under
the protective principle only a "potentially adverse" effect upon the security or
government function is required. Id. at 10-11. See also ExtraterritorialCrime,
supra note 32, at 1111 (objective territorial theory requires that a significant
adverse effect occur within the asserting state's jurisdiction whereas the protective principle allows jurisdiction over crimes that are intended to have an adverse effect).
53. Harvard Research, supra note 32, at 552.
54. Id. The focus of the protective principle is the "nature of the interest
that may be injured, rather than the place of the harm or the place of the conduct causing the harm or, for that matter, the nationality of the perpetrator."
ExtraterritorialCrime, supra note 32, at 1137.

55. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 10-11.
56. United States v. Birch, 470 F.2d 808, 812 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 931 (1973).
57. United States v. Williams, 464 F.2d 599, 601 (2d Cir. 1972).
58. United States v. Rodriquez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961). See also United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d
1147, 1154 (11th Cir. 1985) (protective principle permits a nation to prosecute
foreign nationals on foreign vessel on the high seas for possession of narcotics).
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fined. 59 Therefore, critics caution against use of this principle to
assert broad criminal jurisdiction because of the possibility that
individuals will face prosecution for actions unknown to them as
illegal6 ° and because unjustified expansion of jurisdiction over
crimes committed in other states could exacerbate otherwise
friendly relationships among nations.0 '
4. Passive Personality Jurisdiction
The passive personality principle gives a state jurisdiction over
offenses committed against its nationals wherever those offenses
take place.62 For example, nationals from several countries, including the United States, Italy and Great Britain, were aboard
the Achille Lauro when it was hijacked. Passive personality jurisdiction standing alone would give all states whose citizens were on
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 28, § 33, comment d. The protective
principle is restated in the RESTATEMENT (REvISED), supra note 20, § 402(3).
60. The author criticizes a 1972 amendment to the Israeli penal law that
proscribes certain offenses committed abroad. The amendment was used to
prosecute a Turkish citizen for membership in a terrorist organization. The author states that the legislation illustrates the pitfalls of an overly broad use of
the protective principle:
If Israel unilaterally extends protective or universal jurisdiction to offenses
of membership in organizations, why could not other nations similarly extend extraterritorial jurisdiction to acts of a different nature? Statements,
political contributions, or acts of economic significance as simple as deciding where to invest may be deemed by one country or another to violate its
new conception of international law or to harm its security interests.
Id. at 1103. See ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,supra note 44, at 1096-97, 1101.
See also Note, Bringing the Terrorist to Justice:A Domestic Law Approach, 11
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 71 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bringing the Terrorist to
Justice].
In Bringing the Terrorist to Justice, the author notes that a state wishing to
expand protective jurisdiction to cover terrorists offenses should be able to draft
domestic legislation accordingly. Id. at 76 n.17. He gives as an example a 1975
amendment to the French penal code that expands protective jurisdiction yet
limits the principle to felonies against French diplomatic or consular agents or
officers. Id. at 77.
61. See ExtraterritorialCrime, supra note 32, at 1138.
62. See Bringing the Terrorist to Justice, supra note 60, at 78. For example
in the Lotus case, the Turkish Penal Code contained legislation providing:
Any foreigner who, apart from the cases contemplated by Article 4, commits an offence abroad to the prejudice of Turkey or a Turkish subject for
which offence Turkish law prescribes a penalty.. .shall be punished in accord with the Turkish Penal Code provided that he is arrested in Turkey.
Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 10, at 14-15.
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the ship a jurisdictional base to prosecute the terrorists under
their own criminal laws. While United States courts continue to
recognize the passive personality principle,63 the principle has

been widely criticized. 4 The RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW rejects use of the passive personality principle as

a basis of jurisdiction under international law.6 5 Some authorities
suggest, however, that the passive personality principle could be
used either in conjunction with other more firmly recognized jurisdictional principles66 or if implemented with a direct and limited purpose, such as securing the safety of a state's citizens from
67
the threat of terrorism.
63. See, e.g. States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1984). In Benitez, the
defendant, a non-United States citizen, was convicted in the United States for
conspiracy to murder, assault and robbery of United States Drug Enforcement
Agents. The crime occurred in Colombia, South America. The court found that:
[t]wo of the principles enumerated in Rivard [were] applicable in this case
- the protective principle and the passive personality principle. Under the
former, jurisdiction is based on whether the national interest is injured;
under the latter, jurisdiction is based on the nationality or national character of the victim (citing United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp 212 (N.D.
Cal. 1981). We have no doubt that jurisdiction exists in this case under
these principles.
Benitez, 741 F.2d at 1316; see also United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d
1373, 1381 (11th Cir. 1972) (passive personality allows jurisdiction over persons
or vessels that injure the citizens of another country).
64. The passive personality principle has been criticized and is subject to the
same concerns expressed with regard to the protective principle over potential
abuse. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. The protective principle, however, is limited by the requirement that the crime must threaten the government's national interests or security. No such requirement is placed on the passive personality principle. See Bringing the Terrorist to Justice,supra note 60,
at 79.
65. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), supra note 28, § 30(2) & comment e. "A state
does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule attaching legal consequences to
conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground that the conduct
affects one of its nationals." Id. § 30 (2). But see RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra
note 20, § 402, reporter's note g, which does not reject the passive personality
principle but merely notes that it has faced considerable controversy. The RESTATEMENT (REVISED) further acknowledges that the passive personality principle "has been increasingly accepted when applied to terrorist and other organized attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their nationality, or to
assassinations of a state's ambassadors or government officials." Id.
66. Bringing the Terrorist to Justice, supra note 60, at 79.
67. Id. The author states that the potential for abuse of the passive personality principle can be mitigated
if implemented with a direct and limited purpose, namely securing the

932

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

5.

[Vol. 18:.915

Universal Jurisdiction

The universal theory recognizes that certain offenses are so heinous and so widely condemned that any state may punish an offender once custody is obtained. 8 Piracy is the most commonly
recognized universal crime.6 9 Additionally, certain other crimes
have captured international interest, such as slave trade, traffic in
70
women for prostitution, narcotics trafficking, and war crimes.
These offenses, however, have not acquired universal status primarily because of an inability to obtain a consensus among nations as to which offenses should be prosecuted and punished on
the same basis as piracy.7 1 The RESTATEMENT (REVISED), however,
elevates the crimes of slave trade, aircraft hijacking, genocide and
war crimes to universal status.7 2 Although terrorism is mentioned
as a possible universal crime,7 3 it has not acquired full universal
status because of an inability to agree on its definition. 4

safety of one's citizens from terrorist acts abroad, the risk of abuse would
be minimized. For, while it may be too much to expect the average citizen
to be familiar with all of the criminal laws of every country, it is not unrealistic to assume he would realize that committing a terrorist act might
subject him to foreign prosecution.
Id.
68. See Harvard Research, supra note 32, at 445; ExtraterritorialCrime,
supra note 32, at 1139.
69. Harvard Research, supra note 32, at 563-564; RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 28, § 34. Section 34 states:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law with respect to piracy on
the high seas and to enforce it in its territory or on the high seas, provided
such action is consistent with international law as stated in the Convention on the High Seas of April 29, 1958.
Id.
70. Id. § 34, reporter's note 2.
71. See Harvard Research, supra note 32, at 569.
72. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 20, § 404, entitled "Universal Jurisdiction to Define and Punish Selected Offenses," states:
A state may exercise jurisdiction to define and punish certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as
piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war
crimes, and perhaps terrorism, even where none of the bases of jurisdiction
indicated in § 402 is present.
73. Id.
74. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 20, § 404, comment a; Extraterritorial Crime, supra note 32, at 1109; see also STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM, supra
note 12, which notes:

The semantic confusion over the precise definition of terrorism... has
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B. Jurisdiction When Jurisdiction Collides
Because international and domestic legal principles allow the
extraterritorial extension of laws, two states may assert and have
arguable bases for concurrent jurisdiction. 75 In this situation, determination of which state has the greater jurisdictional claim
may be difficult, particularly since jurisdictional rules of international law are less comprehensive and less precise than the domestic jurisdictional laws of individual nations.1 8 International
law recognizes certain limitations on a nation's authority to exercise jurisdiction that affects other states. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 7 lists certain factors that modify the exercise of extraterri-

torial jurisdiction when two states have concurrent jurisdiction to
prescribe and enforce their laws.78 These factors include vital national interests and the extent to which the proscribed conduct
takes place within a state's territory. 79 Relying upon what it dehindered formulation of national and military policy by nations of the free
world. Consequently, it has been hard to formulate authoritative and systematic doctrinal and policy recommendations on initiatives to prevent,
deter, and decrease the effectiveness of terrorist acts, or to punish identified terrorists after the fact.
Id. at 25. See generally Paust, A Survey of Possible Legal Responses to International Terrorism: Prevention, Punishment and Cooperative Action, 5 GA. J.
INT'L & COM. L. 342, 432-35. Paust discusses how efforts to obtain acceptance of
the 1972 Draft Convention for the Prevention of Certain Acts of Terrorism were
hampered by definitional issues. Id. at 432-35. See also S. Res. 186, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S8751 (1985) which calls upon the President to negotiate a treaty to prevent and respond to terrorist acts. The resolution states that
the treaty should incorporate a working definition of terrorism and should establish uniform laws on asylum, extradition and punishment of terrorists. See
also S. Res 473, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., 122 CONG. REC. S13,201-02 (1984). S. Res.
473 encourages states to negotiate a functional definition of international terrorism and supports universal jurisdiction over terrorism as a means of facilitating
prosecution of terrorists. Id. at S13,201.
75. See, e.g., Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10.
76. See ExtraterritorialCrime, supra note 32, at 1109. Blakesley's article
compares and contrasts United States domestic and international law relating to
jurisdiction over extraterritorial crime. Blakesley concludes that recent case law
and the RESTATEMENT (REVISED) have extended jurisdictional theories beyond
their traditional meanings. Id. at 1111-12.
77. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 28, § 40.
78. Id.
79. Section 40 states:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law
and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the
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scribes as a "principle of reasonableness," 80 the RESTATEMENT
(REvISED) lists factors that restrain a state's assertion of jurisdiction over activities or persons having connections with other
states."' Acts by one state against another state that are consid-

part of a person, each state is required by international law to consider, in
good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the
light of such factors as:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the
territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can
reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
Id.See United States v. First National City Bank (Citibank), 396 F.2d 897 (2d
Cir. 1968), in which the court applied these factors to resolve a conflict between
a United States court order requiring the Frankfort, Germany office of Citibank
to produce documents and German law that prohibited release of the files under
German secrecy laws. The court said § 40 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) required it to "balance the national interests of the United States and Germany
and to give appropriate weight to the hardship, if any, Citibank will suffer." 396
F.2d at 902. The court ruled in favor of the issuance of the subpoena.
80. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 20, § 403, comment a and reporter's
note 1. See id. § 403, reporter's note 10, which states that the factors listed in §
403 are derived from sections of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) and also include
consideration of factors listed in § 6 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1971).
In contrast to prior § 40 [RESTATEMENT (SEcOND)] reasonableness in all the

relevant circumstances is understood here not as a basis for requiring that
states consider moderating their enforcement of laws which they are authorized to prescribe, but as an essential element in determining whether,
as a matter of international law, the state has jurisdiction to prescribe.
RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 20, § 403, reporter's notes 10.
81. The RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 20, § 403, entitled "Limitations
on Jurisdiction to Prescribe," states:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a
state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to the activities, relations, status, or interests of persons or things having connections with another state or states when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable.
(2) Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable is judged by evaluating all the relevant factors, including where appropriate,
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating state, or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect
upon or in the regulating state;
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ered unreasonable are deemed to be "exorbitant. 8'

2

Thus, even if

grounded upon a legitimate jurisdictional base, the exercise of
criminal jurisdiction over acts committed in another state's territory may be perceived as intrusive upon a state's sovereignty and
thereby in violation of international law. s3 The RESTATEMENT (RE-

(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and
those whom the law or regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of
such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected
or hurt by the regulation in question;
(e) the importance of regulation in question to the international
political, legal or economic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
(3) When more than one state has a reasonable basis for exercising jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by two or more
states are in conflict, each state is expected to evaluate its own as well as
the other state's interest in exercising of jurisdiction in light of all the
relevant factors, including those set out in subsection (2); and to defer to
the other state if that state's interest is greater.
Id.
82. See ExtraterritorialCrime, supra note 32, at 1112. Blakesley describes
assertions of jurisdiction as "exorbitant"
if there is significant interest by another state in asserting jurisdiction.
Using the terminology of private international law or the conflicts of law,
the rule of reasonableness is an attempt to determine the proper forum
when two or more states have a traditional basis for asserting jurisdiction.
Thus, no assertion of jurisdiction is proper without one (or more) of the
bases, but even if such a basis exists, the rule of reasonableness may block
the exorbitant or unreasonable assertion of jurisdiction.
Id. See also RESTATEMENT (REvISED), supra note 20, § 403, reporter's note 1,
stating that some states have questioned various applications of United States
laws as "exorbitant," for instance United States antitrust legislation and trade
legislation. The reporter's note also states that application of the "effects doctrine," supra note 49, to economic effects has been questioned as unreasonable.
83. ExtraterritorialCrime, supra note 32, at 1112. Blakesley asserts that the
"notion of reasonableness functions to disallow or to find unlawful the exercise
of jurisdiction, even pursuant to a traditional basis for it, when such exercise
would be 'exorbitant."' Id. at 1156; accord RESTATEMENT (REvISED), supra note
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states that when more than one state has a "reasonable"
basis for jurisdiction,8 4 each state should conduct an "interest"
85
evaluation and defer to the state whose interest is greater.
VISED)

C. Jurisdiction to Enforce: Constitutional Requirements
Once a state validly prescribes a rule of law, it has jurisdiction
to enforce" that law within its territory, 7 as long as the accused
is present 8 and jurisdiction is exercised in conformity with the
United States Constitution. 9 Conformity with constitutional
principles also is required for the prosecution of acts committed
outside the United States either by a national or an alien.90 His20, § 403, comment a. Blakesley further states that § 403 of the RESTATEMENT
(REvISED) "generally considers assertion of jurisdiction over acts committed in

foreign territory as being exorbitant, unless the acts are universally condemned."
ExtraterritorialCrime, supra note 32, at 1162.
Arguably the application of anti-terrorism legislation to acts committed
abroad by non-United States citizens would not offend the rule of reasonableness because acts of terrorism have been universally condemned or at least have
attracted universal interest. Terrorism, however, is not yet considered officially a
universal crime to be treated like piracy. See ExtraterritorialCrime, supra note
32, at 1140. Numerous international conventions on the subject of terrorism are
evidence of the crime's universal condemnation. See, e.g., InternationalConvention Against the Taking of Hostages, June 3, 1983, - U.S.T. , T.I.A.S.
, ____U.N.T.S.-; Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against InNo. ternationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, entered into
ConU.N.T.S. _;
force Feb. 20, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, vention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
U.N.T.S.
entered into force Jan. 26, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, For a comprehensive treatment of international conventions and treaties
dealing with terrorism prior to 1979, see CONTROL OF TERRORISM- INTERNATIONAL
DOCUMENTS (1979).
84. Reasonable jurisdiction could be asserted by more than one state when,
for example, one state exercises territorial jurisdiction and another state exercise
nationality jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (REvIsED), supra note 20, § 403 comment d.
85. See id. § 403 (3) & comment e.
86. See definition of "jurisdiction to enforce," supra note 21.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 28, § 20.
88. See RESTATEMENT (REvisED), supra note 20, § 442(2) (Tent. Draft No. 2
1981), which states: "A court in the United States may not try a criminal action
without the presence of the accused."
89. Id. § 442, comment b. Comment c to § 442 elaborates upon the constitutional safeguards to United States criminal prosecutions, such as requirements
regarding the presence of the accused and the location of trial.
90. Id. § 442 comment c (iv), which states:
-.
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torically, United States courts have been very reluctant to deny a
court's authority to try a defendant once the accused appears
before the court, regardless of the methods used to secure his
presence. 9 In 1886, the United States Supreme Court enunciated
this attitude in the now-famous case of Ker v. Illinois.92 In Ker,
the Court upheld the conviction of a defendant who had been
kidnapped by a United States agent in Lima, Peru, and brought
back to the United States to stand trial for larceny and embezzlement. The Court said:
[A]uthorities of the highest respectability ...

hold that such forci-

ble abduction is no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the court which has
the right to try him for such an offence and presents no valid objection to his trial in such court. 3
Many years later, the Supreme Court in Frisbie v. Collins 4 reaffirmed the Ker ruling in its decision upholding the murder conviction of a man forcibly seized in Chicago, Illinois, by Michigan
officers and carried back to Michigan. The Frisbie Court concluded that
[t]he power of a court to try a person for a crime is not impaired
by the fact that he had been forcibly brought within the court's
jurisdiction by reason of "forcible abduction.".

. .[Prior

cases] rest

on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when one
present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprised of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional safeguards ...

[N]othing in the Consti-

tution requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully
In those instances in which the United States applies its criminal law to
acts committed outside the United States, whether to its nationals abroad,
to aliens abroad under the "protective principle", or in the application of
universal jurisdiction (§ 402(2)(3) and § 404), the accused must be tried in
a United States court (or a court of one of the States), and subject to
constitutional safeguards for those accused of crime.
91. See generally, Shafer, District Court Jurisdiction Over Criminal Suspect Who Was Abducted In Foreign Country and Returned to United States
for Trial or Sentencing, 64 A.L.R. FED. 292 (1983); Chermside, Jurisdiction of
Federal Court to Try Criminal Defendant Who Alleges That He Was Brought
Within United States JurisdictionIllegally or As Result of Fraud or Mistake,
28 A.L.R. FED. 685 (1976).
92. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
93. Id. at 444.
94. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
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convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against
his will."
The two Supreme Court cases read together, commonly referred
to as the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, establish a powerful rule of law
that has provided strong precedent for courts to uphold jurisdiction regardless of whether the defendant's presence was secured
by kidnapping, 96 illegal arrest,97 abduction,98 or sabotage.9 9
The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, however, has not weathered the
years without some criticism founded upon constitutional due
process requirements. In 1974, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Toscanino'0 0 refused to apply the KerFrisbie Doctrine in a case involving an Italian citizen convicted in
a United States court of conspiring to import and distribute narcotics. The Italian defendant alleged that agents of the United
States Government kidnapped him in Uraguay, tortured and interrogated him for days and then put him on a commercial flight
to the United States where he was arrested.10 1 After conducting
an extensive analysis of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, the court concluded that the rule had been eroded by subsequent case law expanding due process rights of criminal defendants.10 2 The court
was unable to reconcile the Ker-Frisbie rule with the Supreme
Court's "expansion of the concept of due process, which now protects the accused against pretrial illegality by denying to the government the fruits of its exploitations of any deliberate and un10°3
necessary lawlessness on its part.

95. Id. at 522.
96. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.)
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
97. See eg., United States v. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 873, reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 920 (1957).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 936 (1973).
99. See, e.g., Charron v. United States, 412 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1969).
100. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1974), on
remand 398 F. Supp 916 (1975).
101. Id. at 268-71. The court remanded the case for a hearing on defendant's
allegations of misconduct by United States agents.
102. Id. at 272-73; see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (the Supreme
Court interpreted the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to require the
application of the federal Exclusionary Rule in state prosecutions); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
103. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275.
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Cases subsequent to Toscanino, however, have narrowed the
decision to apply only to actions by government agents that are
extremely outrageous or egregious. Less than a year after Toscanino, the same court retreated from a total abdication of the
Ker-Frisbie Doctrine. In United States ex rel. Lujan v. Geng04
ler,1
the Second Circuit confirmed the conviction of a defendant,
who, relying on Toscanino, claimed his abduction from Bolivia to
the United States violated his due process rights. Distinguishing
Toscanino, the court stated that it had not intended to eviscerate
the long-standing Ker-Frisbie rule. 10 5 The court recognized that

Ker and Frisbie:
no longer provided a carte blanche to government agents bringing
defendants from abroad to the United States by the use of torture,
brutality and similar outrageous conduct, [it] did not intend to
suggest that any irregularity in the circumstances of a defendants
arrival in the jurisdiction would vitiate the proceedings of the
criminal court.0 8 (Emphasis in original).
While courts have expressed due process concerns regarding
forcible seizure of defendants to obtain personal jurisdiction,
cases subsequent to Toscanino have generally followed the KerFrisbie Doctrine. Limitations to the rule are apparent only when
evidence exists of outrageous conduct on the part of law enforce10
ment officials. 7

D. Forcible Seizure: Violation of International Law
Even if jurisdiction is upheld, forcible arrest or kidnapping
from another country of a suspected felon, may nonetheless violate international law."0" For example, the RESTATEMENT (RE104. 510 F.2d 62, 63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
105. Id. at 65.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (forced emetic solution into defendant's stomach to recover swallowed morphine capsules offended
decency and fairness, shocked the judicial conscious, and offended sense of
justice).
108. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1986, at Al, col. 4. The newspaper article, entitled "U.S. Is Said to Weigh Abducting Terrorists Abroad for Trial Here," discusses possible plans by the U.S. government to seize persons in the Middle
East who have been implicated by U.S. authorities in recent terrorist attacks. Id.
The article quotes Abraham Sofaer, legal advisor to State Department, as saying
he would support seizure of terrorists, but acknowledging that such moves would
violate international law. Id. The article states the opponents of seizure of ter-
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recognizes that enforcement measures, even if safe from judicial scrutiny, may still be subject to legal constraints. The
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) contends that enforcement measures
VISED)

are exercises of jurisdiction, and are subject, under international
law, to the requirement of reasonableness. Enforcement frequently
implies coercion, but in some instances the line between persuasion, inducement and coercion is unclear. Often, there is doubt
about where reasonable pursuit of one state's jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its law ends, and unwarranted intrusion into another state's jurisdiction begins. 1 9
Additionally, the RESTATEMENT (REVISED) places limitations on
external measures employed by a state to enforce its criminal
laws, 110 based on the widely understood principle that "officials of
one state may not enter or exercise their functions in the territory
of another state without the latter's consent.""' Violation of a
state's territorial sovereignty absent consent entitles the violated
rorists cite fears about the effect such action would have on the country involved
as well as the reactions of European allies. Id. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 25,
1986, at A26, col. 1 (editorial stating that "snatching" terrorists is no longer a
farfetched idea).
109. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 20, ch. 3,introductory note, at 29192.
110. "External Measures in Aid of Enforcement of Criminal Law" are set
forth in the RESTATEMENT (REVISED) as follows:
(1) A state may enforce its criminal law within its own territory through
the use of police, investigative agencies, public prosecutors, courts, and
custodial facilities, provided
(a) the law being enforced is within the state's jurisdiction to
prescribe;
(b) when enforcement is through the courts, the state has jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect to the person who is the target of the
enforcement; and
(c) the procedures of investigation, arrest, adjudication and punishment are consistent with the state's obligations under the law of
international human rights.
(2) A state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the
territory of another state only with the consent of the other state, given by
officials of the consenting state authorized to do so.
Id. § 432.
111. Id. § 432, comment b. Comment b further states: "Thus, while a state
may take certain measures of enforcement against a person in another state, §
431, its law enforcement officers cannot, generally, arrest him in another state,
and can engage in criminal investigation in that state only with that state's
consent."
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state to protest and receive reparation if appropriate. 112 In the
famous case of Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann,113 persons allegedly carrying out the instructions of the Israeli Government kidnapped Eichmann, a Nazi war criminal, from Argentina
and returned him to Israel to stand trial." 4 In a complaint to the
United Nations Security Council, Argentina vehemently objected
to the kidnapping as a violation of its sovereignty. 115 The breach
of international law was healed only by an agreement between
Israel and Argentina to treat the incident as closed."-'
Years later, Israeli tactics again were questioned when an Israeli military court convicted a Turkish citizen for crimes committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of Israel. 1 7 The defendant was captured during an Israeli raid into Lebanon."" In
addition to jurisdictional questions, the defendant's forcible abduction raised issues of violation of international law because of
the apparent intrusion upon another state's sovereignty." 9
United States courts also have acknowledged the potential international consequences of forcible abduction. For example, the
Toscanino court, 2 0 citing Eichmann, recognized that the international kidnapping of an Italian citizen from Uraquay violated
both the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States.' 2 ' Additionally, in several recent
United States cases, courts have faced demands by foreign states

112. Id. § 432, comment c.
113. 36 I.L.R. 5 (Israel District Court Jerusalem 1961). For a general discussion of the Eichmann trial, see P. PAPADATOS, THE EICHMANN TIAL (1964).
114. THE EICHMANN TRIAL, supra note 113, at 53.
115. The United Nations Security Council treated Eichmann's abduction
like an international tort for which Israel was enjoined to make appropriate reparations to Argentina. See Resolution of June 24, 1960, 15 U.N. SCOR (868th
mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960). See also Schwarzenberger, The Eichmann
Judgment, 15 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 248, 253 (1962).
116. The Eichmann Judgment, supra note 115, at 254.
117. See ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,supra note 44, at 1087-88.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1103.
120. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267.
121. Id. at 277-78; see also ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,supra note 44, at
1112-13. The author argues that in addition to violating national sovereignty,
use of forcible abduction would undermine international and domestic laws of

extradition and ultimately violate individual human rights. Id.;see also Cardozo,
When Extradition Fails, Is Abduction the Solution? 55 Aiu. J. INT'L L. 127
(1961).
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desiring to prosecute United States nationals who enter their territory to abduct others accused of a crime in the United States. In
Kear v. Hilton,122 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed

extradition of a professional bondsman to Canada to stand trial
on kidnapping charges resulting from the bondsman's apprehension of a bail jumper who had fled to Canada. The bondsman had
seized the bail jumper and returned him to Florida to stand trial.
Canada, upset by the apparent violation of its territorial
sover123
eignty, filed kidnapping charges against the bondsman.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENT
The Terrorist Prosecution Act which passed the Senate contains only two sections, beginning with Section 2331 that sets
forth the bill's findings and purposes. 24 This section notes that
more than half of the incidents of international terrorism between
1968 and 1985 were aimed at United States targets. 2 " This sec122. 699 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1983).
123. Id. "Canada permissibly might take a dim view of aliens descending
upon it and abducting persons located within its borders without prior resort to
legal process or to Canadian officials." Id. at 184; see also Villareal v. Hammond,
74 F.2d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 1934) (appellants violated sovereignty of Mexico
where defendant sought asylum when appellants seized defendant unlawfully
and took him back to the United States); Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17, 19 (4th
Cir. 1931) (federal officer guilty of kidnapping after forcibly carrying accused out
of Canada into the United States).
124. See infra note 125 for the text of the findings and purposes section.
Specter stated that the findings and purposes section is designed to "make it
clear the act is intended to cover acts of international terrorism, as opposed to
barroom brawls or other violence which fails to trigger these national interests."
S. 1429, supra note 15, at S1384.
125. Section 2331 states:
The Congress hereby finds that:
(a) between 1968 and 1985, there were over eight thousand incidents of
international terrorism, over 50 per centum of which were directed against
American targets;
(b) it is an accepted principle of international law that a country may
prosecute crimes committed outside its boundaries that are directed
against its own security or the operation of its governmental functions;
(c) terrorist attacks on Americans abroad threaten a fundamental function of our Government: that of protecting its citizens;
(d) such attacks also threaten the ability of the United States to implement and maintain an effective foreign policy;
(e) terrorist attacks further interfere with interstate and foreign commerce, threatening business travel and tourism as well as trade relations;
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tion further states that international law recognizes that a country may prosecute crimes committed outside its boundaries if
those crimes are "directed against its own security or the operation of its government functions ...."126 Based on this principle,
Congress found that terrorist attacks on United States citizens
abroad (1) threaten the government's function of protecting its
citizens; (2) threaten the ability of the United States to implement and maintain an effective foreign policy; (3) interfere with
interstate and foreign commerce; and (4) threaten business travel,
tourism, and trade relations. 2 7 The bill expresses Congress' purpose as: "[T] o provide for the prosecution and punishment of persons who, in furtherance of terrorist activities or because of the
nationality of the victims, commit violent attacks upon Americans
outside the United States or conspire outside of the28 United States
to murder Americans within the United States."'
The proscribed crimes and their penalties are set forth in Section 2332 which states:
(a) Whoever outside the United States commits any murder... or manslaughter. . ., or attempts or conspires to commit
murder, of a national of the United States shall upon conviction in
the case of murder be punished as provided in section 1111, for
manslaughter be punished as provided in section 1112, for attempted murder be imprisoned for not more than twenty years,
and for conspiracy be punished as provided by section 1117 of this
title, notwithstanding that the offense occurred outside the United
States.
(b) Whoever outside the United States, with intent to cause serious bodily harm or significant loss of liberty, assaults, strikes,
and

(f) the purpose of this chapter is to provide for the prosecution and punishment of persons who, in furtherance of terrorist activities or because of
the nationality of the victims, commit violent attacks upon Americans
outside the United States or conspire outside of the United States to murder Americans within the United States.
126. Id. § 2331(b). "[T]here has been a great deal of tough talk about terrorism, but very little tough action. The enactment of this measure will enable the
United States to supplement the tough talk with some tough action," Sen. Specter told the Senate. S.1429, supra note 15, at S1385.
127. Id. § 2331(c)-(e).
128. Id. § 2331(f). "At the heart of this bill is the notion that international
terrorists and ought to be treated as such - that they should be located
promptly, apprehended and brought to trial for their heinous crimes," Sen.
Specter told the Senate, S.1429, supra note 15, at S1383.
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wounds, imprisons, or makes any other violent attack upon the
person or liberty of any national of the United States or, if likely to
endanger his person or liberty, makes violent attacks upon his business premises, private accommodations, or means of transport, or
attempts to commit any of the foregoing, shall be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
Whoever in the commission of any such act uses a deadly or dangerous weapon shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both.
(c) Whoever, outside of the United States, conspires to commit
murder, as defined in section 1111(a) of this title, within the
United States of any national of the United States, shall be punished as provided in section 1117 of this title notwithstanding that
the offense occurred outside the United States.
(d) As used in this section, the term "national of the United
States" has the meaning given such term in section 101(a)(22) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
(e) No indictment for this section can be returned without the
12 9
written approval of the Attorney General or his designee.

The Act approved by the Senate bears little resemblance in
language or form to the Terrorist Prosecution Act, introduced
July 11, 1985, that underwent hearings before the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism (the Subcommittee). 130 For purposes of comparison and perspective, the Terrorist Prosecution Act of 1985 that entered the Subcommittee is

129. Id. § 2232. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1982) states that the penalty for first
degree murder is death unless the jury qualifies its verdict by adding the words
"without capital punishment," in which event the punishment is imprisonment
for life. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1112 (1982) states that the punishment for manslaughter is imprisonment for not more than ten years; the punishment for involuntary
manslaughter is a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more
than three years or both. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1117 (1982) states that the punishment for conspiracy to murder shall be imprisonment for any term of years or
for life. Specter noted in remarks to the Senate that § 2332(e) states that only
the Attorney General can return an indictment under the Act. Specter said,
"The intention of this section is to further ensure that application of the law is
limited to acts of national interest consistent with the findings and purposes set
forth in the act ....
[T]hese provisions are adequate to satisfy this objective
and, thus, the bill does not attempt to define terrorism." S. 1429, supra note 15,
at S1384.
130. For a text of the proposed Terrorist Prosecution Act that was considered by the Senate Subcommittee, see S. 1429, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG.
REC. S9430-32 (1985).
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discussed below. This bill granted jurisdiction to United States
courts to try anyone who assaulted or murdered any national of
the United States regardless of where the crime occurred if the
crime was part of an "act of international terrorism."' 131
Section 2321(a) of the Act stated:
(a) Whoever in an act of international terrorism kills or attempts
to kill any national of the United States shall be punished as provided under section 1111, 1112, and 1113 of this title, except that
any such person who is found guilty of murder in the first degree
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life, and any such person
who is found guilty of attempted murder shall be imprisoned for
not more than twenty years.' 32
Upon introducing the bill, Senator Arlen Specter noted that
during the 98th Congress legislators passed two anti-terrorism
131. See infra note 148 regarding definition of "act of international
terrorism."
132. S. 1429, supra note 130, at S9430. Section 2321(b) of the Act, supra
note 130, stated:
(b) Whoever in an act of international terrorism assaults, strikes,
wounds, imprisons or makes any other violent attack upon the person or
liberty of any national of the United States in any foreign country or in
internationalwaters or air space, or, if likely to endanger his or her person or liberty, makes violent attacks upon his or her official premises,

private accommodation, or means of transport, or attempts to commit
any of the foregoing, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than three years, or both. Whoever in the commission of any such
act uses a deadly or dangerous weapon shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. (emphasis added).
Note that § 2321(b) above, which applied to assaults, strikes, and wounds,
etc., contains the specific jurisdictional limitation "in any foreign country or in
international waters or air space." Yet, § 2321(a), which applied to murder, did
not contain this language. Apparently, § 2321(a) as written applied to domestic
attacks as well as attacks abroad. The reason for this distinction is unclear. See
Bills to Authorize Prosecutionof Terrorists and Others Who Attack U.S. Government Employees and Citizens Abroad. Hearings on S.1373, S. 1429 and S.
1508 Before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary,99th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (statement of Abraham Sofaer) [hereinafter cited as TerrorismHearings]. Additionally, subsection (b) referred to "vio-

lent attacks upon his or her official premises, private accommodations, or means
of transport." Sofaer notes that such attacks against foreign officlals, official
guests or internationally protected persons are already covered by 18 U.S.C. §
112(a), infra note 149. TerrorismHearings, supra note 132, at 10-11. Regarding
private citizens, Sofaer "would question whether such a provision, which derives
ultimately from the international legal protections for diplomats codified in the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, is necessary or appropriate." Id.
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bills that provide United States courts with extraterritorial jurisdiction over the crimes of hostage taking13 3 and aircraft sabotage.13 4 According to Specter, the Terrorist Prosecution Act was
designed to fill a "critical gap [that remains] in our arsenal
against terrorism: murder of U.S. citizens outside our borders,
other than of specially designated Government officials and diplomats, is not a crime under U.S. law.' 3 5 In hearings on the Act
before the Subcommittee,' 3 6 Abraham Sofaer, legal advisor to the
Department of State, testified that the Act was "both warranted
37
by reality and logic, and consistent with international law.'
The June 19, 1985, murder of four Marines and two United
States civilians at a sidewalk cafe in San Salvador exemplifies the
need for such a bill, Sofaer said. 3 Although United States law
protecting internationally-protected persons would govern the
murders of the Marines,3 9 the murders of the civilians in San
Salvador are not presently United States crimes, Sofaer said. 40
Other positive comments about the bill have included its usefulness in encouraging other nations to either extradite or prosecute

or to enact similar legislation."'
133. See Hostage Act, supra note 2.
134. Aircraft Sabotage Act, supra note 17, 18 U.S.C.A. § 31-32 (West Supp.
1985).
135. S. 1429, supra note 130, 131 CONG. REC. at S9430. Specter stated:
I was stunned to realize that those responsible for murdering over 260 U.S.
marines while they slept in their barracks in Lebanon are not guilty of any
U.S. crime for their murder. Existing law punishes only those who assault
our diplomats. Under my bill, when a U.S. marine or any other American
is killed or wounded, an investigation can be initiated and the culprits can
be brought to this country and prosecuted.
Id.
136. Terrorism Hearings, supra note 132.
137. Terrorism Hearings, supra note 132, at 2 (statement by Abraham
Sofaer).
138. On June 19, 1985, gunmen dressed as members of the Salvadorean

armed forces opened fire upon an outdoor cafe in San Salvador. Thirteen persons, including four off duty United States Marines and two United States businessmen, were killed. At least 15 persons were injured. N.Y. Times, June 21,
1985, at Al, col. 4.
139. See infra note 149.
140. Terrorism Hearings, supra note 132, at 2-3 (statement of Abraham
Sofaer).
141. Robert Oakley, director of the Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning, testified in 1985 before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism that the proposed bill (1) can be useful in efforts to obtain extradition or
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The Terrorist Prosecution Act considered by the Subcommittee
was itself the revised version of S. 3018,142 which was later reintroduced with amendments as S. 1373.143 These earlier bills are

collectively entitled "Protection of United States Government
Personnel Act of 1984 (1985)." S. 3018, the earlier and more narrow of the three bills, covered crimes of murder or attempted
murder "in international waters or air space, [against] any officer,
agent or employee of the United States Government ...

.4 The

1985 version of the Protection of Government Personnel Act
broadened the scope of S. 3018 by substituting the word "citizen" 145 for the words "any officer, agent or employee (emphasis
supplied).

'146

The amended Terrorist Prosecution Act, however,

abandoned any attempt to limit protection to either United
States personnel or citizens by substituting the terms "any national of the United States (emphasis added). 147
While broadening the scope of the persons covered by the proposed legislation, the Terrorist Prosecution Act limited applicapersuading another government to prosecute, by emphasizing that criminal acts
by terrorists require punishment, (2) is a useful step in developing an international legal framework against terrorism by filling gaps in United States criminal
jurisdiction and encouraging other states to enact similar legislation and (3) is a
symbolic measure that underscores United States reaction to a series of recent
murders of United States citizens overseas. TerrorismHearings,supra note 132,
at 1-2 (statement of Robert B. Oakley, director, Office for Counter-Terrorism
and Emergency Planning). Sen. Jeremiah Denton, in opening remarks before the
same Subcommittee, said:
The pattern that emerges ...

is that terrorism is the most widely prac-

ticed form of modern warfare. It is both a major force and a major trend in
foreign affairs. How successful have we been in dealing with terrorist warfare against our commerce, soldiers, diplomats, facilities, leaders, and private citizens? Not very ....

Terrorism must be dealt with on many fronts

and a military response alone will not suffice. First, we must have laws
that are sufficient to meet the threat. We must have a mechanism capable
of enforcing these laws ....

We must in the end be prepared to employ a

full range of sanctions: legal, diplomatic, economic and military.
Id. (statement of Sen. Jeremiah Denton).
142. S. 3018, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., 130 CONG. REc. S11,776 (1984).
143. S. 1373, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. Rzc. S8961 (1985). Both S.
3018 and S. 1373 were introduced by Sen. Specter.
144. S. 3018, supra note 142, at S11,776.
145. S. 1373, supra note 143, at S8961.
146. S. 3018, supra note 142, at S11,776.
147. S. 1429, supra note 130, § 2331(a).
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tion of its provisions to acts of "international terrorism. ' 148 This
language was not included in the previous two Senate bills. In

comments to the Senate upon introduction of the Terrorist Prosecution Act, Senator Specter said the revised language clarified
that the bill's objective was to regulate acts of "international terrorism" and not "bar-rooms [sic] brawls."'

49

Sofaer, in his address

148. The Terrorist Prosecution Act adopted the definition of "international
terrorism" in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §
1801(c) (1982). The FISA defines international terrorism as activities that:
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation
of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be
a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United
States or any State;
(2) appear to be intended(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and
(3) occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons
they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their
perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
Id. In hearings before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Sofaer expressed reservations about the use of the terms "in an act of terrorism." Terrorism Hearings, supra note 132, at 4 (statement of Abraham Sofaer). He said:
We would not be surprised if the Department of Justice had concerns
about making it an element of the offense that the deed in question have
been done "in an act of terrorism." The requirement could raise evidentiary and constitutional problems that could unduly complicate prosecutions under this legislation. While the Department of State is comfortable
with the bill in this respect as drafted, we believe that investigatory and
prosecutorial concerns deserve careful attention from the Committee, and
we may in the future develop with Justice a joint position on this issue.
Id. at 4.

149. S. 1429, supra note 130, at S9431. Specter states that the Terrorist
Prosecution Act simply tracks current law that protects diplomats and other
internationally protected persons from assault and murder and extends such law
to United States nationals who are victims of international terrorism. Id. Specter is referring to 18 U.S.C. § 112 (1982) and 18 U.S.C. § 1116 (1982). Title 18
U.S.C. § 112(a) states:
(a) Whoever assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons, or offers violence to a
foreign official, official guest, or internationally protected person or makes
any other violent attack upon the person or liberty of such person, or, if
likely to endanger his person or liberty, makes a violent attack upon his
official premises, private accommodation, or means of transport or attempts to commit any of the foregoing shall be fined not more than $5,000
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before the Senate Subcommittee, asserts that inclusion of the
terms "in an act of international terrorism" not only restricts the
bill's scope but also serves a practical jurisdictional purpose.15 In
particular, Sofaer's comments allude to the problem of basing jurisdiction solely on the weakest theory -- the passive personality
principle. 151
Even though some States may extend their criminal jurisdiction
generally to serious crimes against their nationals abroad, any such
extension should be implemented cautiously. Local authorities bear
the primary reponsibility [sic] for law enforcement within their territory, and in the case of most crimes against Americans abroad
[we] ordinarily [have] no reason to consider asserting our criminal
jurisdiction extraterritorially. As Sen. Specter noted, we want to
focus our
efforts on international terrorism, not "barroom
52
brawls."1

Jurisdiction of United States courts over such crimes as terrorism was provided in section 2321(d) of the bill. This subsection
stated:
The United States may exercise jurisdiction over the alleged offense if the alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the place where the offense was committed
or the na15 3
tionality of the victim or the alleged offender.
Specter stated that the extension of jurisdiction of United
States courts to terrorist crimes committed abroad "in no way
contravene[s] or conflict[s] with either international or constituor imprisoned not more than three years, or both. Whoever in the commission of any such act uses a deadly or dangerous weapon shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1116(a) provides:
(a) Whoever kills or attempts to kill a foreign official, official guest, or
internationally protected person shall be punished as provided under sections 1111, 1112, and 1113 of this title, except that any such person who is
found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life, and any such person who is found guilty of attempted murder shall be imprisoned for not more than twenty years.
150. Terrorism Hearings, supra note 132, at 4 (statement of Abraham
Sofaer).
151. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
152. Terrorism Hearings, supra note 132, at 4 (statement of Abraham
Sofaer).
153. TerrorismHearings,supra note 15, § 2321(d), 131 CoNG. REc., at S9432.
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tional law."' 54 "While criminal jurisdiction is customarily limited
to the place where the crime occurred, it is well-established constitutional doctrine that Congress has the power to apply U.S. law
extraterritorially if it so chooses," Specter said. 15 Not only does

Congress have the power to apply United States law extraterritorially, but extension of this jurisdiction is also recognized under
international law. 156 Specter based the jurisdiction of United
States courts to apply the Act extraterritorially upon the "potential adverse effect" the crime may have upon a nation's security
or the operation of its governmental functions. 57
Even if the Terrorist Prosecution Act provides the necessary
subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute persons who attack
United States citizens or personnel abroad, personal jurisdiction
over the offender must be obtained before he can be tried in a
United States courtroom. 55 The suspect must first by seized or
arrested and brought to the United States to stand trial. In remarks supporting S. 1373, Specter suggested that
in dealing with the crime of terrorism, we ought to find the terrorists when we have some reason to believe we know who they are.
It requires an investigation. It requires pursuit. It may require extradition or, where extradition is not possible, it159may require abduction to bring these vicious criminals to trial.
According to Specter, these forceful tactics may be necessary in
situations in which (1) the nation's government may be incapable
of enforcing law and order 6 0 or (2) the nation flagrantly violates
154. Id. at S9431.
155. Id. Specter cites Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922), for this proposition.
156. Id.
157. Id. In remarks before the Senate, Specter said, "International law also
recognizes broad criminal jurisdiction. If an alleged crime occurs in a foreign
country, a nation still may exercise jurisdiction over the defendant, pursuant to
the 'protection principle,' if the crime has a potentially adverse effect upon its
security or the operation of its governmental functions." S. 1492, supra note 15,
at S1383. Comments to S. 3018 stated that even absent a nexus between the

United States and the terrorist attack abroad, jurisdiction over the terrorist's
crime could be analogized with the universal crime of piracy. S. 3018, supra note

142, at S11,775. Specter stated that if a "pirate can be prosecuted wherever he is
found, so should a terrorist be prosecutable wherever the terrorist is found." Id.
158. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
159. S. 1373, supra note 143, at 8960.

160. Id.
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international law or harbors international terrorists.16 1
The language of subsection (d) of an amended version of the
Terrorist Prosecution Act (formerly subsection (c) in S. 3018 and
S. 1373) omitted language contained in the two earlier Senate
bills that the United States may exercise jurisdiction over the alleged offender if he is present in the United States irrespective of
the manner in which he was brought before the court.162 As a
compromise toward facilitating passage of the bill, this controversial language disregarding the manner in which the terrorist is
brought to the United States was dropped in the amended Terrorist Prosecution Act that entered the Subcommittee.' 63 This
language, referred to as the bill's "abduction" language, appeared
to condone the use of self-help by the United States to procure
personal jurisdiction over the terrorist. Even after the language
was omitted, Senator Specter continued to support the use of forcible seizure to bring terrorists to justice.1 4 Instead of relying
161. Id.
162. Proposed § 2321(c) stated:
(c) The United States may exercise jurisdiction over the alleged offense
if the alleged offender is present in the United States irrespective of the
place where the offense was committed or the nationality of the victim or
the alleged offender or the manner in which the alleged offender was
brought before the court (emphasis supplied).
S. 3018, supra note 142, at S11,776.
163. See S. 1429, supra note 130, § 2. During hearings before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Sofaer noted the absence of so-called "selfhelp" language in S. 1429.
I was glad to see that the bill does not provide for any "self-help" measures. The Due Process Clause of the Constitution does not automatically
preclude U.S. courts from trying persons forcibly seized abroad by U.S.
authorities. It would be wrong, however, to extrapolate from this the conclusion that such seizures themselves are perfectly lawful ....

In general,

seizure by U.S. officials of terrorist suspects abroad might constitute a serious breach of the territorial sovereignty of the foreign State, could violate local kidnapping laws, and might well be viewed by the foreign State
as a violation of international law and as incompatible with any bilateral
extradition treaty in force. Yet, self help is sometimes necessary in various
areas of public and private law, ande [sic] this area is no exception. In
light of the fact that the bill itself contains no self-help provision, I will
leave to a more appropriate occasion a further treatment of this question,
which in any event should proceed only after close consultation with the
Department of Justice and other interested agencies.
Terrorism Hearings, supra note 132, at 5 (statement of Abraham Sofaer).
164. During a segment of the MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour on October 10,
1985, concerning the Achille Lauro incident, Sen. Specter was asked whether the
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upon specific language of the Act to support the abduction of
known terrorists, Specter relied instead upon existing law. He
told the Senate:
In many cases, the terrorist murderer will be extradited or seized
with the cooperation of the government in whose jurisdiction he or
she is found. Yet, if the terrorist is hiding in a country like Lebanon, where the government, such as it is, is powerless to aid in his
removal, or in Lybia [sic], where the Government is unwilling, we
must be willing to apprehend these criminals ourselves and bring
them back for trial. We have the ability to do that right now,
under existing law....

Forcible seizure and arrest is a strong step,

but threat of terrorism requires strong measures, and this is clearly
preferable to the alternatives of sending in combat troops or bombing a few neighborhoods. 165
United States should attempt to apprehend the Achille Lauro hijackers to prosecute them. A portion of the conversation follows:
MAcNEu: If they [hijackers] are not turned over to the United States or Italy or

put on trial there, should the United States make some attempt to get them
itself?
SEN. SPECTER: Well, if we could, short of military action, I think that we should.
There is precedent by the Supreme Court of the United States which says that
if we can attain custody of people, we can bring them to the United States....
MAcNEI: Would you approve a clandestine semimilitary operation to grab
them, like the Israelis grabbed SEN. SPECTER: Eichmann.
MAcNEm: Eichmann.
SEN. SPECTER. Yes, I would, providing it was done carefully; providing that it was
targeted to the specific individuals; that it did not run a material risk of hitting
innocent people; and that it could be done discreetly. That is the substance of a
bill which I introduced 18 months ago in the United States Senate.
MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour, transcript #2619, Oct. 10, 1985, pp. 5-6 (copy available at the offices of the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law). Later in the
newscast, MacNeil asked another guest, Professor Hisham Sharabi, of Georgetown University, about his views on the seizure of terrorists.
MAcNEIL: Professor Sharabi, let me ask you this, finally - we have a minute.
The Senator says the United States would be justified in seizing these hijackers
and bringing them back here for trial? What is your feeling about that?
PROFESSOR SHARABI: I'm against that. I think that would be engaging in the kind
of terrorism that President Reagan mentioned in - a few weeks ago. I don't
think that's the way that a superpower should act.
MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour Transcript # 2619, Oct. 10, 1985, at 7.
165. S. 1429, supra note 15, at S1384. The existing law referred to by Specter
is the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine. For a discussion of this doctrine, see supra notes 92-
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In addition to omitting the "abduction" language of S. 3018
and S. 1373, the Terrorist Prosecution Act revised section 2321(e)
to read:
In enforcing subsections (a) and (b), the Attorney General may
request and shall receive assistance from any Federal, State, or lo-

cal agency, including the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, any statute, rule, or regulation to the
contrary notwithstanding.166

Sofaer stated that the Terrorist Prosecution Act properly allocated responsibility for enforcement of terrorism laws to the Ex-

ecutive Branch because of competing foreign policy and international diplomacy considerations.167 Sofaer cautioned, however,

against the allocation of functions within the Executive Branch,
i.e., to the Attorney General.
Ultimately, the President must decide how best to direct U.S.
agencies, in particular the armed forces, to carry out international
law enforcement activities relating to acts that occur abroad, that
sometimes involve foreign states, and that always raise diplomatic,

strategic, military and political considerations. A statute mandat-

ing a particular allocation of functions within the Executive
Branch would hinder our ability to respond in the most effective
and appropriate manner to the international terrorist threat. 6 '

IV.

ANALYSIS

The Terrorist Prosecution Act which received Senate approval
is a watered down version of previous attempts by Senator Specter to draft legislation giving United States courts jurisdiction
over terrorists who commit murder or other violent crimes against
99 and accompanying text.
166. S. 1429, supra note 130, at S9432. The revised subsection (e) language
omitted reference to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as a government
agency that could be called upon by the Attorney General to provide assistance
in enforcing subsections (a) and (b) of the Act. The bill approved by the Subcommittee further omitted reference to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Note that S. 1429, which passed the Senate, omitted this subsection entirely.
This was the only major difference between the legislation that was recommended by the Subcommittee and the bill that passed in the Senate. See supra
text accompanying note 129.
167. Terrorism Hearings, supra note 132, at 8 (statement of Abraham
Sofaer).
168. Id. at 8-9.

954

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 18.915

United States nationals. The Act no longer confines its scope to
terrorist crimes committed against United States nationals
abroad but extends jurisdiction to crimes conspired outside the
United States but committed against nationals within United
States borders. Similarly, the Act omits any language giving
courts jurisdiction irrespective of the manner in which the terrorist is brought to the United States.169 Likewise, the Act abandons
any attempt to define "international terrorism,'

70

merely refer-

ring to "terrorist attacks" in the bill's findings and purposes section.11 1 Regardless of the Act's attempted simplicity, two basic

problems still exist: (1) whether the legislation is founded on accepted jurisdictional principles and (2) if jurisdiction is proper,
whether the exercise of jurisdiction over terrorists by forcible
seizure or abduction is consistent with constitutional and international law. Clearly, Congress has authority to prescribe legislation
that extends extraterritorially to crimes committed outside
United States borders, especially when such intent is clearly expressed.1 72 The Terrorist Prosecution Act states that the exercise
of jurisdiction by the United States over the alleged offender will
vest if the alleged offender is present in the United States notwithstanding that the offense occurred outside the United
States.17 3 Thus, drafters of the bill did not intend to limit its application to either territoriality or nationality jurisdictional principles, but rather intended the bill to have extraterritorial effect.
Yet, Congress must do more than just create a statute and announce that it has extraterritorial effect.1 74 Enforcement of stat-

utes that affect conduct outside a state's borders depends upon
the existence of an acceptable jurisdictional base.175 Ostensibly,
the Terrorist Prosecution Act shares the same jurisdictional base
as S.3018 and S.1473 which were grounded upon the protective
principle. This principle allows the extraterritorial extension of
laws to conduct occurring outside a state's borders if that conduct
threatens the state's security or governmental functions. 76 In
comments to the Senate upon reintroduction of the Protection of
169. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.

170. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 128.
See supra note 23.
Id.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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United States Government Personnel Act of 1985, 7 the precursor to the Terrorist Prosecution Act, Senator Specter stated that
the "protective principle" was the proper jurisdictional base:
Clearly, then, the exercise of U.S. criminal jurisdiction is also justified to prosecute the terrorist who assaults or murders American
personnel abroad. Such attacks undoubtedly have an adverse effect
upon the conduct of our Government's foreign affairs, and poten78
tially threaten the security interests of the United States as well.1
Even if the protective principle alone were a proper jurisdictional
theory upon which to base both S. 3018 and S. 1473, that base
weakens considerably when coverage is broadened to encompass
all United States nationals. Both the Terrorist Prosecution Act
approved by the Senate and the original act expand the nature of
the offense and the extent of asserted United States jurisdiction
under the protective principle such that little if any nexus is required between the terrorist attack and the supposed threat to
the nation's security or government functions. For example, in
such a situation as a random airport attack 17 9 or an attack at a
San Salvador cafe,180 the murder of United States nationals
presents only a very indirect threat to the security of the United
States. What remains is only a tenuous connection between the
terrorist attack and a presumed intention by the terrorist organization to influence the United States government.
Likewise, reliance upon the Terrorist Prosecution Act for jurisdiction to prosecute terrorists who murder United States citizens
may be unnecessary in situations in which use of the protective
principle would be most acceptable. For example, during the
Achille Lauro hostage incident, a United States national was murdered. If the United States obtained physical custody over the
terrorists, they could conceivably be prosecuted for murder under
the Terrorist Prosecution Act. However, the Terrorist Prosecution Act would be superfluous in a hostage situation, because the
crime is already governed by the 1984 Hostage Act,""1 which currently provides a maximum penalty of life imprisonment-the
18 2
same penalty under the Terrorist Prosecution Act.

177. S. 1373, supra note 143, at S8960.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
See supra note 2.
When Specter proposed S. 1508, supra note 2, which seeks the death
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The legislation would also be unnecessary in a situation in
which United States Marines were killed while stationed
abroad. 18 3 This situation would be covered by 18 U.S.C. section
1116184, which deals with the murder of internationally protected
persons. 185 Thus, the Terrorist Prosecution Act seems most applicable to the random attack of a United States national who is
neither an internationally protected person nor a person taken
hostage during an act of international terrorism. Thus, the Terrorist Prosecution Act would be most useful, for example, in the
unlikely event that the United States gained custody over the terrorists responsible for the two murders of Americans in the Rome
airport. Such a scenario, however, is precisely the situation in
which justification for the protective principle as a jurisdictional
base for the Act breaks down. A claim of jurisdiction based on the
protective principle requires more than a tenuous nexus to the
security or government functions of the United States. The protective principle requires that the crime have an intended adverse
effect in the country proscribing the conduct. " In the airport
raid, the alleged targets of the attack were Israeli citizens. The
United States citizens were killed because they were in the wrong
place at the wrong time. In the San Salvador incident, the attack
upon the cafe, in which United States Marines and United States
citizens were killed, was arguably intended to influence United
States military and political policies in Central America. Yet, if
penalty for first degree terrorist murder as a result of a hostage situation, he also
indicated that S. 1373 and S. 1429 also should be amended to include the death

penalty, stating:
I did not provide for the death penalty in S. 1373 or S. 1429 in order to

expedite the passage of these bills. When these bills are considered on the
floor, I intend to add the death penalty provision, but if the death penalty
provision cannot be passed or if it is file bracketed then we should at least

enact the subcommittee provisions of S. 1373 and S. 1429.
S. 1508, supra note 2, at S10,182.
183. See, e.g., TIME, Oct. 1, 1984, at 30. On September 20, 1984, at least a
dozen persons were killed, including two U.S. liaison officers, when a suicidal
terrorist car bombed the United States Embassy in East Beirut. On April 18,
1983, 63 persons, including 17 Americans, were killed in a carbomb attack on the
United States Embassy in West Beirut. Six months later, on Oct. 23, 1983, 241

U.S. servicemen were killed when a truckbomb hit the U.S. Marine headquarters
near Beirut International Airport. Id. at 31.

184. See supra note 149.
185. Id.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 52-61.
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the only victims had been two United States civilians on personal
business in San Salvador, use of the protective principle to confer
jurisdiction under the theory that the act was intended to cause a
detrimental effect in the United States would be difficult to justify. Absent a basis for asserting protective jurisdiction, passive
personality 87 is the only remaining jurisdictional principle to justify the extraterritorial application of legislation with intent to
protect all United States nationals abroad. The RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), however, rejects the use of this principle as an independent jurisdictional base.188 Nonetheless, United States courts continue to recognize the passive personality principle particularly
when it is used in conjunction with other jurisdictional principles,
such as the protective principle. 18 9 Growing acceptance of the passive personality principle is acknowledged by the RESTATEMENT
(REviSED), particularly when the principle is applied to terrorist
attacks upon a state's nationals or assassination of ambassadors
or government officials. 190 Even critics of the passive personality
principle concede that the danger of abusing this principle to obtain jurisdiction over a terrorist crime is mitigated since any person who commits a terrorist act should realize that such act is
probably a crime in some foreign state.19 ' Thus, arguably jurisdiction under the protective and passive personality principles, even
though precarious, would attach to the Terrorist Prosecution Act
when used to prosecute persons who are charged with terroristrelated murders of United States nationals abroad.
Enforcement of the Terrorist Prosecution Act depends upon
the presence of the accused terrorist in the United States. This
presence could be secured in one of two ways: (1) extradition by
the state holding custody of the terrorist or (2) use of force by the
United States to secure custody. The former is an accepted
method of resolving competing interests between two states; the
latter is not. This is true even if the state seeking custody claimed
jurisdiction over the terrorist act under either protective or passive personality principles. For example, if the United States used
force to capture a known terrorist, it would be violating another
state's territorial sovereignty. This action would violate principles
187.

See supra text accompanying notes 62-67.

188.

See supra note 65 and accompanying text.

189.
190.
191.

See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See supra note 67.
Id.
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of international law and exacerbate international relations. The
Achille Lauro incident aptly illustrates this point. Assuming that
both the United States and Italy had passive personality, protective or universal jurisdiction to prosecute the hijackers, an impasse was created when both states asserted a desire to prosecute
and punish the captured terrorists. 192 In this situation, resort to

international principles placing limitations on jurisdiction to prescribe would be useful.19 3 Factors in both RESTATEMENTS en-

courage one state to consider the other state's interests in asserting its jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its laws. Factors listed
in the RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

would encourage use of a balancing

test to weigh the competing interests of each state similar to the
analysis conducted by the Citibank court.194 The RESTATEMENT

(REVISED), applying its reasonableness standard, encourages the
state with the lesser interests to defer to the state with the
greater interests when conflicts arise. The United States, by demanding custody of the Achille Lauro hijackers and the Palestinian leader Abbas, seemed to ignore the other state's interests in
prosecuting the terrorists. Although the United States ultimately
conceded custody to Italy, the incident created a rift in otherwise
friendly relations between the two countries.
The Terrorist Prosecution Act seemingly disregards concerns
for equitably balancing each nation's sovereign and national interests. Implicit in the legislation is the contemplation that
United States agents and personnel might be enlisted to aid in
the seizure or abduction of terrorists to return them to the United
States to stand trial. Even if United States case law upholds the
right to try persons who are forcibly seized and brought into the
courtroom, 95 international law limits such action. 196 The Terrorist Prosecution Act is unacceptable as a tool to justify the intrusion upon another state's territorial sovereignty. Such disregard
for the national interests of other states, whether friend or foe,
can only result in impaired international relations. 197 Supporters

of the bill argue that in situations in which a known terrorist
finds haven in a state supporting terrorism, legal recourse is im192.

See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.

193. See supra note 81.
194. See supra note 79.
195. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.

197. See supra text accompanying notes 4-7.
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possible or highly improbable. Even under these circumstances,
use of terrorist tactics by the United States to fight terrorism is
difficult to support under either domestic or international legal
principles. The danger always exists that the use of force, if justified by legislation, will not be limited to the above situations but
will be used even against friendly nations that have competing
jurisdictional claims. Also present is the fear that forceful action
by the United States against unfriendly nations would escalate
into a major confrontation between the United States and other
states.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Terrorist Prosecution Act, which has passed the Senate in
amended form, represents an effort by lawmakers to fill a gap in
the United States legal arsenal against terrorism by giving courts
jurisdiction to prosecute terrorists who commit murder against
United States nationals abroad or terrorists who conspire outside
the United States to commit terrorist attacks against nationals
within the United States. This legislation can be supported as a
signal by the United States of its willingness to consider all
means of legal sanctions as part of its comprehensive policy for
controlling terrorism. Arguably, the legislation may be based on a
combination of the protective and passive personality jurisdictional principles, particularly in light of the recent acceptance of
the passive personality principle as a jurisdictional base to protect a state's citizens from terrorist acts. Drafters of the bill, however, have promoted the legislation as a tool to gain personal custody over terrorists by forcible abduction and unauthorized entry
into another country's sovereign territory. Enforcement of the
proposed Terrorist Prosecution Act cannot be supported, therefore, under international legal principles that prohibit a state's
violation of another state's territorial sovereignty without that nation's consent. Even absent the restrictions of foreign relations
law, forceful action by the United States to kidnap felons has undergone critical scrutiny by domestic courts. Legislation that encourages the use of force by the United States to kidnap terrorists
and return them to the United States to stand trial can only be
viewed as legislation encouraging the participation by the United
States in its own form of terrorism.
Catherine Collier Fisher

